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Summary findings
Telecommunications was the first network utility to be  intervention  (Oftel set string caps until 1997), or to
privatized in the United Kingdom. Drawing on 15 years'  competition  (there are hundreds of players in the
experience and discussion in the field, Valletti shows the  market). Valletti contends more weight should probably
economic principles of regulation in general and access  be given to the first two.
pricing in particular that have been implemented.  Entrants have not achieved big market shares, if one
British Telecommunications (BT), formed as a public  considers the asymmetric regulation that has been in
enterprise in 1980-81, was privatized in 1984. Since  place for more than a decade. Indirectly, at least,
then the approaches to regulation have changed in three  competition benefited consumers by applying discipline
broad periods:  the duopoly, the transition to  to BT's behavior.
competition,  and the recently introduced normalization  Oftel's approach was interventionist until 1997, when
phase.  it began trying to normalize the industry, as authority
Dealing with each period, Valletti focuses on how the  overseeing competition. The odds on complete
actual implementation of access charges are determined,  deregulation are slight, and some controls on industry
at the same time providing background needed on  will remain.
regulatory intervention generally.  In the longer term, Oftel should especially monitor
Rather than follow the model of competition for a  anticompetitive practices and collusive behavior among
common infrastructure,  Oftel has encouraged  the bigger players (BT, CWC, and cellulator operators).
competition between alternative networks, which  The United Kingdom's interconnection  experience
benefits customers but involves duplication of fixed  demonstrates the complexity of the problem and its
costs. As a result of Oftel's approach, consumers have  relationship to other topics, such as tariff rebalancing,
seen their bills reduced 50 percent in real terms since  access deficit, and universal service. Although a bit ad
privatization.  hoc, the recent incentive regulation, with a network cap
It is difficult to know how much to attribute this  based on proper accounting procedures and engineering
remarkable result to technological progress (BT halved  models, may represent the best practice available today
its workforce in the same period), to regulatory  in the telecommunications industry, says Valletti.
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21.  Introduction
In the UK, telecommunications  was the first network  utility to be privatised.  The experience  and
wide-range  discussions  accumulated  in 15 years, provide an excellent field to test the economic
principles of regulation in general,  and access pricing in particular. British  Telecommunications
(BT) was first formed as a public enterprise  in 1980/81,  and then privatised  in 1984. Since then,
the regulator has followed different approaches  that can fall quite neatly into three phases: the
duopoly  period,  a period of transition  to competition,  and a normalisation  phase that has just been
introduced.'
This paper deals with each period and it concentrates  the discussion  on the determination
of  access charges. Since it is impossible and possibly misleading to  consider access issues
without referring to the context into which it they were developed, we will also provide a
background  on the more general  regulatory  intervention  adopted. 2 This will not only clarify some
properties  of the various approaches,  but it will also confirm that the access pricing problem is
crucial  for the development  of effective  competition  and as such cannot  be studied  in isolation.
2.  The duopoly period (1984-1991)
At the time of privatisation,  the UK Government committed  itself to license a single entrant,
Mercury,  to compete with BT. The incumbent  was left intact as a vertically integrated  network
operator and service provider since it was thought that the limited dimensions of the British
market  did not justify a break-up  policy similar  to that adopted  for AT&T  in the US. The position
of Director General of Telecommunications  (DGT) was created to regulate the industry. The
DGT heads  the Office of Telecommunications  (Oftel)  and has the authority  to issue orders  which
are enforceable in  UK  courts. If  the  DGT and a  license holder cannot agree on  license
amendments,  then the Monopolies  and Mergers  Commission  acts as an arbiter.
Mercury's license  was granted  in 1982, although  it started operations  only in 1985.  At the
same time, the first cable television  franchises  were awarded,  but the duopoly  policy prohibited
them, as well as other operator, from offering fixed telephony services until 1991. A similar
duopoly policy was also followed for cellular services with two licenses awarded to  Cellnet
(partly owned by BT) and Vodafone (see Valletti and Cave, 1998).  In return for its protection,
Mercury undertook some mild obligations  to expand its network. The strategy of the entrant
quickly appeared  to be to connect  directly  only a limited number of large business users, and to
attract smaller  users to its network  for long distance  and international  calls, thus requiring  access
to BT's local loop.
1 See Beesley (1995) for the  initial period; Armstrong  et al.  (1994) for the transition to  competition; Armstrong
(1997) and Cave (1997a) for more recent events.
2 Annex 1 contains some general statistics that are commented in the main text.
3The results from direct competition were a bit disappointing.  Mercury did not fight for
market  shares,  with  the  exception  of  small  profitable  segments.  The  discipline  was  rather
imposed by the price control. RPI - X price cap regulation was chosen for a weighted basket of
services (weights are calculated by the previous year's  revenue shares from the various products).
X was initially set at 3% for a period of five years. An important exception was made for line
rentals.  Although they were  perceived to  be  below  costs, the  incumbent was required  not  to
increase them by more than RPI + 2% in any year. Finally, BT had to provide similar services at
geographically uniform prices.
In 1989 a new price control set the X factor to 4.5% for a period of four years, and at the
same time the basket of regulated services was broadened. The separate cap on domestic rental
charges was kept and  extended  to  include business  line rentals  and  connection charges.  The
regulator  - concerned  about unevenly  spread  benefits  from  competition  - also  asked  BT  to
introduce low-user schemes.
2.1  Rebalancing of call charges
Immediately after privatisation,  it appeared clear that large cross-subsidies existed from  long-
distance to local calls. BT had also inherited low rental charges, reflecting the typical promotion
of telecommunications among residential users. 3 The incumbent asked permission to rebalance its
charges, on the basis that they were not in  line with  costs. However, the regulator  feared that
rebalancing could on the one hand be unacceptable for low-income families and rural areas and,
on the other hand, undermine the liberalisation process (BT could in fact rebalance its tariffs only
on the segments it expected competition from Mercury).
In the end, the separate cap of RPI + 2% on line rentals represented a sort of compromise,
giving the freedom to achieve some degree of rebalancing, subject to non-discrimination among
similar categories of users all over the country. This  choice supplied Mercury with  sufficient
oxygen to make inroads into the market, but it also created a new policy dilemma. The incumbent
could in fact claim it had a serious access deficit, resulting from public service obligations and
from the fixed costs of the local loop that could not  be covered by constrained rentals. While
there was general consensus that these losses had to be partly recouped by call charges, the exact
methodology turned out to be very controversial.
3 This aspect  is a feature  common  to many countries  and it often derives  from political  pressures  to contain  prices  to
consumers.  From an economic  viewpoint,  it was  justified in the past to expand  telephony services  at a fast rate in
order to benefit from positive network externalities  when many customers are connected. However, once the
subscriber base is near to its saturation level, then the externality  effect becomes relatively  small, providing a
rationale  for abandoning  such a subsidy.  Note that the argument  therefore  applies  to developed  markets  with high
penetration  rates and not necessarily  to developing  countries.
42.2  The 1985 determination  -
Some years after its launch, Mercury was able to gain reasonable shares in terms of revenue.
However, BT  controlled virtually all the subscribers'  lines. Hence it is clear that the terms of
interconnection were crucial for Mercury, since every call was either initiated or terminated (or
both)  on BT's  network.  The UK  regulatory  regime  specifies that parties  are free to  seek  an
interconnection agreement  on  a  commercial  basis.  If  that  fails,  then  Oftel can  intervene  to
determine interconnection prices. In  general,  agreements are likely to  be  found  when parties
mutually  benefit  from  interconnection  while  agreements  are  bound  to  fail  when  there  are
divergent interests (see Valletti and Estache, 1998). The intuition is simple: if two parties - A and
B  - can  create a "big  pie"  by  finding an  agreement,  bigger  than any  "pie"  they  can create
independently, then they will be able to get each a sufficiently big slice, the share depending on
the relative bargaining power. On the other hand if the "pie" is of fixed size, then interconnection
cannot increase it, but it simply redistributes rents and it produces a tension: the more party A
gets, the less party B receives and vice versa. Such a contrast is difficult to be resolved.
The predictions of the theory were observed in practice. BT and Mercury were not in stark
contrasts with the mobile  services that were  being successfully launched  in the  same period.
Mobile and fixed services in the early period were not close substitutes to  each other, so that
interconnection could provide a market expansion (the "bigger pie") beneficial to both parties and
interconnection agreements were easily found. On the other hand, there were opposite incentives
for the interconnection between BT and  Mercury: without any  substantial innovation the two
services would have been almost identical (the "fixed pie")  and  each customer subscribing to
Mercury would have represented a customer lost for BT. Not surprisingly, agreements between
BT and Mercury failed and Oftel was called in to determine the charges in 1985, so that Mercury
could enter the fixed telephony market.
BT had  in its license  a condition that allowed  the access  charge to cover the costs of
providing  interconnection, including relevant overheads and a reasonable rate of return on the
relevant  assets on  the basis  of fully  distributed  costs  (FDC) calculated  on  a historic  basis.
Despite  sounding  reasonable,  the  previous  precepts  are  too  vague  without  any  further
qualification. Oftel, however, did not provide detailed explanation of its methodology. Oftel ruled
Mercury  to  pay  for  all  the  direct  costs  of  providing  access  (labour,  laying  cable,  altering
exchanges, etc.) and a per-minute  charge for the use of the local network, this charge varying
with  the  time  of  the  day  (cheap/standard/peak  rate)  and  with  the  distance  of  the  delivery
(local/short national/long national). 4 After the initial determination, the charges would be indexed
over time according to RPI - 3%, unless parties requested a new determination. The exact method
used to deterrnine the charges was not made public, but it was clear that they did not include any
contribution to BT's access deficit in order to assist the new entrant.
4 See  Annex  2 for details.
5One of the reasons for not giving detailed explanations  about the determination,  was that
Oftel feared that parties could then appeal for judicial review on specific issues, leading to a
further and embarrassing delay. At the same time, some barriers to entry existed for Mercury,
most notably its subscribers  had to use a special and expensive  telephone  (with a "blue button")
to access the entrant's long-distance  services. This can explain in part why initial charges were
believed to  be pretty much in Mercury's favour. In practice, access charges were felt by all
comnmentators  as being discounts on the incumbent's retail  prices thus providing a signal to the
entrant about the profitability of entry in  different segment. Remember that BT was quite
constrained  on its pricing policy: rentals were still cheap and could not be increased sharply
Hence BT could not decrease too much its long-distance  prices in order to break even. As a
result, Mercury  did not find it convenient  to enter in the local loop (where it could obtain access
to BT's network  at a fairly low charge) while a good margin was available  for investments  in a
long-distance  network. The effect of Oftel's policy was then set to provide incentives  to build a
trunk  network  (see Armstrong  and Doyle, 1998).
Summary:  the duopoly  phase
*  In the duopoly phase (1984-1991), asymmetric regulation was in place. The incumbent was constrained in the
rebalancing of its tariffs (line rentals in particular).
*  Private agreements between BT and Mercury over access charges failed and the regulator had to intervene.
*  The details of the  interconnection determination were  not made public, but they probably took  into account
Mercury's  disadvantages. Although BT's  license contained  some guidelines (FDC), in practice the desire to
promote competition prevailed over all other issues.
*  Access  charges  performed  a  signalling  function.  Access  charges  were  perceived  as  being  based  on  the
incumbent's prices so as to ensure Mercury's  viability in some segments.
3.  Transition  to competition  (1991-1997)
In 1991, the duopoly review initiated major structural changes and the market was opened to
many  additional  network  entrants.  Most  notably,  entrants  included  cable  television  (CaTV)
operators and other utilities companies. While the latter could build telecommunications facilities
around  their  existing  networks, 5 the  former  benefited  from  scope  economies  between
broadcasting and telecommunications services. The principle to assist entry that had been applied
to  Mercury  for its  seven protected years, was  also followed for cable  operators. While  cable
networks  could  offer  telecommunications  services,  PTOs  could not  offer  entertainment  TV
services. The reason was once again to assist entry, in particular into local markets, something
that Mercury did not succeed (before April 1997 Mercury had virtually no residential subscriber
directly connected). Note  that  CaTV operators only  lay cable in the local  area,  so they need
interconnection for trunk services.6
5 Energis has established a network built on the high voltage electricity transmission grid. Other entrants include
British Rail and British Waterways.
6 A crucial move for the expansion of the cable market was also to allow foreign investors (mostly North American)
to bid for the franchises. Since 1991 the cable TV market has been growing quite rapidly. At April 1997, 2.5 million
6The Government awarded licenses in virtually all markets, including two new licenses for
personal  communication  mobile  services  (PCS).  The  duopoly  policy  was  still  retailed  for
international calls, although some competition was gradually put in place by first allowing simple
resale of international leased lines, then opening up the field in mid 1996. More than 150 licenses
have  been  awarded so far,  but  one  has  to  be  very  careful  with  these  numbers,  since many
operators are in small niches and, despite entry assistance, at the end of 1997 BT still accounted
for nearly 90% of all fixed exchange lines. The duopoly review brought the X factor down to
6.25% while the tariff basket was enlarged to include international calls. From 1993, for a period
of four years, BT's  retail prices were further tightened to RPI - 7.5%. The low-user scheme was
extended  to  cover the quarter  of BT's  customer  who used the  telephone  least. The standard
connection charge for installation had to be reduced by 40% to £99, implying some losses to BT
in  rural areas. In order to  fight predatory behaviour, it was also  decided not to  count quantity
discounts (optional tariffs) toward the calculation of the price index.
In summary, in the first decade of price-cap regulation, the regulatory process became
more public  (with an  extensive  use of consultation  documents), and,  at the same time,  more
pervasive  and stringent. By going into the details of how caps  are determnined,  it can also be
recognised that the mechanism has still the flavour of rate-of-return regulation. With so many
new operators with small networks,  it was obvious that the  1991 duopoly  review brought the
issue  of  interconnection  again  to  the  centre  of  the  public  debate.  Recall  that  the  1985's
determination, originally in Mercury's  favour, constrained access charges to fall according to  a
RPI - 3% formula. This was in contrast with the much faster rate of decline in retail prices, so
that by  1991, they indexation made them rather generous for BT.  BT and Mercury  could not
agree on a revision of charges, and in  1992 the parties asked the DGT to reassess conditions of
their earlier agreement. Contrary to  7 years  earlier, interconnection had a big  and rather open
debate. The determination concentrated on conveyance charges and was published in December
1993 (see Annex 3 for details).
The determination was not meant  to  be  a  definite solution, and  a period of  extensive
discussion  and  consultation  followed.  In  early  1994,  a  three-stage  program  on  accounting
separation and interconnection was started. The first stage used the last determination as a basis
for interim charges for other operators. The second stage separated BT accounts to have a more
transparent  process. This also  allowed to implement  a new list of  services and corresponding
charges. The final stage discussed several issues, including cost bases alternative to historic costs,
and possible future directions. The outcome lead to the recent revision of 1997.
lines were installed  (22% penetration),  with 9 million premises  passed. Originally,  more than 100  franchises  were
awarded, but since then the market has considerably  consolidated. In April 1997, three of the biggest cable
companies,  Bell Cablemedia,  Nynex CableComm  and Videotron,  merged  with Mercury  to create Cable&Wireless
Communications  (CWC).
73.1 Access deficit contributions
According to BT's  initial license and successive amendments, interconnection charges had to be
calculated around three elements: a) the fully-distributed cost (FDC) of conveyance calculated on
a historic-cost basis (HCA), b) the applicable rate of return on the relevant capital employed,
finally c) an access deficit contribution (ADC). The ADC intended to take into account the losses
which  BT  suffered for  being unable to  raise  its  line rentals.  For instance,  in  the  fiscal year
1992/93, BT's profitability by service, using FDC on a HCA basis was as follows:
Service:  Access  Inland calls  International  Total group
calls
ROCE (%/)  -9  +45  +53  +18
BT had to face regulatory constraints that were onerous for the incumbent: capped prices,
low rentals and social obligations had to be funded in some way. The rationale behind ADC was
precisely to  recover through  call charges connection and rental charges that were below their
costs. 7
Entrants clearly targeted the most profitable segments. Since interconnection deprived the
incumbent  from  such  extra  revenues,  interconnectors  were  supposed  to  compensate  the
opportunity cost of foregone profits to BT on a per-minute basis. These contributions were set
proportional  to BT's profitability  of the service provided by the competitor. It is clear that the
fornula  used  by  Oftel was  influenced by  the  debate  introduced  by  the  efficient  cornponent
pricing rule (ECPR): ADC compensates for profits foregone by selling to competing operators
instead of selling directly to consumers. 8
Despite  the  specification  of  procedures,  a  fair  amount  of  discretion  was  left  to  the
regulator, so that ADC did not play a big role in practice. First of all, the DGT could decide
which were the relevant overheads over which a "fair" return could be earned (incidentally, note
how the process is reminiscent of cost-plus regulation). In second place, the DGT could also issue
waivers (full or partial). The waiver criteria, valid until 1997, applied to market shares of at most
10% and as long as BT's  share in the market in question did not fall below 85%. Full ADC had to
be paid only if an interconnector's market share exceeded 25%. Additional discretion was added
since ADC could be lowered if BT did not achieve benchmark efficiency (using US data from
RBOC). In practical terms, ADC had to be paid in a few years only for international calls.
7 One can in principle  distinguish  between  an access  deficit,  due to unbalanced  tariffs when rental and connection
costs exceed  the corresponding  charges,  and an universal  service deficit, due to geographically  averaged  tariffs and
uneconomical  subscribers. Without a  proper accounting system, these two types of deficits are difficult to
distinguish. In the initial phase, they were practically pooled together, giving rise to BT's  deficit.
8 See Annex 3 for practical details. A discussion of ECPR can be found in Valletti and Estache (1998), section 3.2.
8In summary, ADC had many merits. It was inspired by the theoretical debate (ECPR in
particular) and it generated a high-profile debate. The concept of an access deficit was developed
for the first time and Oftel tried to make it workable. In practice, waivers made it uncertain and
its  effectiveness was diminished if  not eliminated.  The whole  idea of contributions to  access
deficits was abandoned in early 1996 when the RPI + 2% constraint on BT's  rental charges was
abolished. After 10 years of tariff rebalancing, the access deficit was eliminated and the deficit
caused by Universal Service Obligations was decided to be tackled independently.
3.2  Unbundling and accounting separation
The 1993 determination, not only set interconnection charges for Mercury, but it also provided a
sort of standard list of interconnection services that could be used by other entrants. This list was
deemed  important as a signal for new operators, and  Oftel decided to  further unbundle BT's
services, so that interconnecting operators could just  buy those services which they required. A
standard list for about 60 unbundled wholesale services was published. The trade-off involved
with  unbundling  is  evident:  it  can  foster  competition  as  long  as  it  reduces  the  entrant's
expenditure on access services, but it also requires complicated accounting procedures to allocate
joint  costs. Moreover, unbundling does not promote entrants'  investmnents  in the local loop since
they can rely on the incumbent's assets.
It was generally agreed that something had to be done to deal with the rather arbitrary use
of  fully  allocated  costs  on  a  historic  cost  accounting  basis.  The  task  to  overcome  these
deficiencies, was given to an industry working group (see the next section). Unbundled services
could also perform an additional role on top of sending signals to entrants. They could be used to
detect potentially anti-competitive behaviour of the incumbent. Since 1994/95 BT was required to
publish  separate accounts  of its  activities,  divided  into access, network  and retail  functions. 9
Accounting separation had the double purpose - still undermined by the accounting conventions
used  - to  allocate  costs  in  a  way  that  should  reflect  the  division  between  activities  and
demonstrate  using  audited  financial  statements  that  BT  was  not  engaging  in  unduly
discriminatory behaviour. The last purpose was implemented using an imputation principle: BT
(network)  should  charge  itself  the  same  conveyance  rate  as  it  charges  to  other  operators
purchasing the same service on an interconnection basis.
3.3  Determination of Long Run Incremental Costs
Independently from the recovery of fixed costs, a key  element for the determination of access
charges is the incremental cost caused by the provision of additional output. Oftel recognised that
the system in use (FDC using the HCA convention) was not satisfactory and two alternative cost
methodologies were adopted to  calculate long  run incremental costs  (LRIC). Since LRIC  is a
9 BT network includes  all services  offered  both to interconnectors  and BT retail. BT access includes  costs, capital
employed and revenues from installation,  line rental and other access services to the public switched  telephone
market.  BT retail  is separated  further  into regulated  and  nonregulated  services  categories.
9forward looking concept, the basis for the valuation of an asset should be current cost accounting
(CCA). CCA evaluates the replacement cost of an asset with the lowest cost asset which serves
the same function (this  is called modem  equivalent asset,  and it should incorporate the latest
technology available), rather than the historic cost at the purchase time followed by HCA.
An historical accounting basis may distort decisions when technology is evolving rapidly.
Moreover, inefficient past decisions will have effects on future choices if a HCA basis is adopted.
Take the  example of the replacement  of BT's  ducts: the  current cost  is likely  to  exceed the
historic cost. The reverse is true for switches costs. If access prices are calculated with HCA, then
inefficient entrants may enter access services and efficient firms may not find it convenient to
enter into conveyance. On the other hand,  a CCA basis sends signals to  all players that reflect
current market conditions and therefore a CCA basis is helpful both to the incumbent and to the
entrants in their investment and pricing decisions.
Despite its flaws, HCA is deeply rooted into many firms'  accounting systems and it may
be  the  only  option  available  before  better  accounting  procedures  are  introduced.  Oftel,
anticipating that it would have taken time to switch between the systems, decided to keep the old
one  in place  while  working on  two  interrelated projects.  One  methodology,  known as  "top-
down", was developed by BT to estimate the incremental cost of different network components in
both historic and current cost terms, starting from BT's  management and financial accounting
data. The other model, based  on a "bottom-up" methodology,  involved the construction of an
engineering model of the plants and other parts  needed to provide an inland Public Switched
Telephone Network.
The bottom-up model attempts to determine the cost of network with a topology similar to
BT's  existing network, and to  compute the average  incremental cost of providing a particular
service. The model is rather simple and transparent  and it explicitly focuses on the parameters
that drive network dimensioning. The top-down model contains a large number of categories of
costs, each one with one or more cost drivers and a cost-volume relationship. Its strength is to
examine costs in a highly disaggregated and articulated way, so that, if correctly specified, it can
provide a picture of the way in which output levels drive individual costs. However, both models
also present weaknesses, for instance the top-down approach is strongly influenced by accounting
conventions, while the  engineering models are often  not  enough  articulated. In  addition, the
models use different ways to calculate several factors.'0
In the end, the models produced different estimates for the same interconnection service,
and  a  subsequent attempt  was made  to  integrate and  reconcile the two  approaches. What  is
relevant to our discussion, is that the process lead to a gradual shift toward better accounting
10  For instance,  the bottom-up  model  calculates  operating  costs that  reflect  the international  experience  of a range of
operators,  rather  than BT's experience  alone as implied  by a top-down  approach.  Differences  in utilisation  or pricing
can produce  different  capital equipment  costs.  Alternative  depreciation  profiles  based respectively  on economic  and
accounting  depreciation  can also give rise to conflicting  results  (see Cave, 1  997b  for a discussion).
10practices  and a deeper understanding  of cost  causation and relationships.  In this way, most
overheads can be directly attributed to services, without having to pool them together in a big
category of common and joint costs. Some unattributed costs remain, however, from economies
of  scale and economies of scope  between conveyance and access.  Such remaining costs, that
Oftel estimated in the order of  10% of the costs of the network, have to be apportioned. Oftel
considered  different  options  (incremental cost  with  or  without  equal  mark-up, ECPR,  ADC,
Ramsey) and came up in  favour of the use of equal proportionate mark ups. This principle is
simple and practical, but it is not supported by any theory. It has to be said, however, that the
magnitude of the problem is considerably reduced by the detailed allocation procedure. At the
same  time,  Oftel  also  clearly  stated  that  it  did  not  favour  using  interconnection  charges to
promote entry, rather it wanted to tackle barriers to entry directly. "  I
The methodology  to  calculate  incremental  costs  also  provided  a  system  of  guideline
ceilings and floors that can be used to retain some regulatory control in case the incumbent is
given  more  freedom  to  set  the  structure  of  interconnection  charges.  A  system  of  ceilings
(normally  represented by  the stand-alone  cost)  is intended  to prevent  BT  from  exploiting its
market power by setting excessively high interconnection prices. On the other hand, a system of
floors (normally given by the incremental cost) can be used to monitor against aggressive pricing
with a predatory intent.
Summary: the transition phase
*  In the transition  stage  to competition  (1991-1997),  regulatory  policy  became one of encouraging  (asymmetric)
competition  in the local loop, despite  the additional  infrastructure  investment.
*  The  regulation process became more public,  and,  at  the  same time,  more  pervasive and  stringent.
Interconnection  issues were left to  private negotiations between parties involved, but the regulator still
intervened  for all major  determinations.
*  At the beginning of the period, ADCs provided a practical way of implementing  ECPR, however, DGT's
discretion undermined  the mechanism.  Over time, access charges had to perform less tasks, thanks to the
removal of constraints  on rental charges and to separate approaches  to specific issues (number portability,
USO).
*  With accounting  separation and unbundling,  the access problem shifted from interconnection  prices between
competing operators to the setting of network wholesale prices. A list of network services could provide
transparency  for new entrants. In order for this list to send undistorted  signals, more consistent accounting
practices  were gradually  introduced.
l  A relevant entry barrier exists when number  portability is not available.  Number portability is a source of
customer  inertia  which implies that entrants  find it more difficult to attract customers.  When  the latter cannot keep
their telephone  number, they have to incur costs that can be substantial  for some users (print new paper, inform
business partners and clients,  etc.). The absence  of number  portability  is an example of switching  costs that put a
new entrant at a disadvantage.  Oftel decided that portability  had to be provided by operators from 1998 and it
separated  the problem  from the more general category of interconnection  charges (a specific methodology  was
developed  to apportionate  network  costs caused by portability  provision).  Similarly,  financial  burdens  arising from
universal  service  obligations  were discussed  separately  (see  section  4.2).
114.  Normalisation (1997-2001)
The new price review of 1997  marks a big shift in the approach  followed  by Oftel. The DGT has
made it clear that his aim is to pull back from regulation  as competition  advances,  and to ensure
that fair competition  takes place. Oftel, reversing  the previous  trends of detailed and prescriptive
regulation,  has taken large steps towards being a fair trade authority. This is supposed  to be the
last retail price control,  which should  end in 2001.
The new retail cap has been reduced  by two thirds, covering  services  provided  to a sub-set
of BT's customers that are not likely to benefit from competition.  In particular, the new cap
regime constraints  the average  bill of the 80% of residential  customers who use the telephone
least (X being fixed at 4.5%).12  BT is also still constrained  to charge geographically  uniform
prices for all its services.  The greater flexibility  of behaviour  granted to BT may leave  potential
for abuse of  its dominant position by  charging high prices or engaging in  anti-competitive
practices against its competitors. Oftel has then introduced a  controversial "Fair Trading
Condition"  (FTC) that gives  the regulator  powers  to deal with anti-competitive  behaviour,  based
along the lines specified  by Articles  85 and 86 of the EC Treaty  of Rome.
Oftel is trying to replace its prescriptive  approach  with a proscriptive  one. In a market in
constant evolution like the telecommunications  market, detailed regulation based on clauses
contained  in each operator's license has the risk of becoming  too complex and not in line with
technological  developments.  The FTC gives the regulator the discretion to  intervene quickly
when firms engage in anticompetitive  practices. The higher degree of discretion,  however, may
not provide sufficiently clear guidelines to  the operators and for this reason Oftel is now
promoting a debate on the its new role and on the overlap of jurisdictions with other anti-trust
bodies.  13
4.1  The network  price cap
The system of access charges until 1997 was based on rate-of-return  regulation. A part from
accounting  issues and the allocation  of common  costs, the published  list of BT's services  did not
12  This value has to be compared  with the yearly average reduction  of 2.7% for the same category of users in the
period 1990/91-1995/96  (in the same  period  the average  reduction  for business  users  was 9.3%).
13 The new UK Competition Bill, recently approved by the Parliament in October  1997, proposes major changes in
general competition  law. Like the FTC, the Competition  Bill introduces  two prohibitions  based on Articles 35 and
86 of the EC Treaty;  namely  a prohibition  on the abuse of a dominant  position  and a prohibition  on anti-competitive
agreements.  The DGT  will have concurrent  powers of enforcement  alongside  the Director  General  of Fair Trading.
The Bill provides  for new investigatory  powers and permits  the imposition  of fines for breach of the prohibitions.
The new prohibitions  will come into force on I Mar 2000 and  there will be a one-year  transitional  period.  European
telecommunications  liberalisation  is another strong external influence on Oftel. Because of both technical and
market  convergence  of the broadcasting,  telecoms  and IT sectors,  it becomes  possible  to deliver  similar  services  over
what were previously distinct networks. The European Commission  has recently published a Green Paper on
convergence  and in 1999 the EU will review the overall  regulatory  framework.  In general,  the new EC Directives
give Oftel  significant  implementation  responsibilities.
12give incentives to reduce costs, although the cap on retail prices mitigated the problem. In general
and probably more important, a detailed control of each interconnection service is a very intrusive
and  time-consuming  process. The determination of  each access price by the regulator  is also
subject to a certain degree of arbitrariness, as it can be easily argued about the decision to favour
equal mark-ups to distribute common costs. These deficiencies can be removed by relying instead
on caps to control network charges.
The new  arrangements, in place  from October  1997, give BT flexibility  to  set charges
within a framework of network  caps and other rules. As  with  any other cap mechanism (see
Green and Rodriguez-Pardina, 1998), key parameters set by Oftel include:
*  the level of the charges for interconnection at the beginning of the period;
*  the percentage reduction in real terms in each year (X);
*  the coverage of the cap and the weights of each service within the cap;
*  the duration of the control (four years until September 2001).
Oftel developed  a  sort of "effective  competition  matrix",  to  investigate the  degree of
competition in different markets, recognising that the need for regulation is inversely related with
the degree of competition. Three main areas are identified:  competitive services, prospectively
competitive services, bottleneck and non-competitive services:
*  Competitive services are those where a high degree of competition already exists or without
barriers of any sort to entrants. Competitive services are outside of network control and BT is
free to  set its  charges. In practical terms, only  operator assistance  services belong to  this
category.
*  Prospectively  competitive  services  are those  that  are not  competitive  by  the  time  of  the
introduction of the new regime, but are expected to become competitive during the control
period. These services are regulated by safeguard caps (RPI + 0%), so that initial charges will
not raise. If during the control period services become competitive, then also the safeguard
will be removed. The issue here is that if such services are put in the main basket, then BT
could engage into predatory practices, concentrating price reductions only in areas where it
faces some rivals and keeping high prices in other areas. Services included in this category
are inter-tandem conveyance and transit, international direct dial conveyance, international
private leased circuits, directory enquires services, access to emergency services.
*  For bottleneck and non-competitive services, three separate baskets are capped by the familiar
RPI -X mechanism. These are services that are not likely to be subject to a relevant degree of
competition during the control period. The productivity X factor is fixed at 8% for a four-year
period for all three baskets which cover roughly half of BT's  network activities. The three
baskets are respectively call termination services (local exchange segment), general network
services (call origination, local-tandem conveyance, single transit), and connection services
(interconnection circuits). The main reason for having three separate baskets, is the fear that
BT  may recover an excessive proportion  of its costs from  call termination,  which is very
likely to remain the main bottleneck in place in the future. It should be mentioned that from
131999 there will be an additional basket subject to RPI - 8% to deal with number portability
costs.
In termns  of the size of the market segments, bottleneck and non-competitive services are
definitely the most important ones and very little competition is at the moment taking place at the
network level. Within each cap, individual services are subject to a system of floors and ceilings
based  respectively  on  incremental costs  and  stand  alone  costs  of  an  efficient  operator.  The
weights of each service included in the cap are given by their relative revenue shares in the basket
in the previous  financial year. Revenues are calculated for the accounts of BT network, hence
they include purchases  from BT retail as well as from  other operators. The starting  levels of
charges in the baskets are based on forward-looking LRIC with equal mark-ups using the bottom-
up and top-down methodologies discussed section 3.3.
4.2  Universal service
In this section, we analyse another regulatory development that has traditionally affected access
pricing  consideration:  Universal Service  Obligation (USO).  Considerations  on USO typically
involve two classes of problems: its definition and the mechanism for its funding. Until the year
2001, with a possible review in 1999, the level of universal service consists of:
*  a connection to the fixed network able to support voice telephony and low speed data and fax
transmission;
•  the option of a restricted package at a low cost; 14
*  reasonable access to public call boxes;
*  free access to emergency services and access to operator assistance and directory information;
*  the option for customers to chose an outgoing calls barred service together with a repayment
plan, as an alternative to disconnection;
*  the provision of services af geographically averaged prices.
Note that access to Internet services is not included in the definition of universal service.
This is because Oftel believes that the idea of universal service should not be used to promote
new technologies. The problem of access to Internet for schools, as wells as telephony services
for  disabled  people,  is  tackled  separately  from  USO.  BT  is  the  only  operator  that  has  an
obligation to universal service. With the end on the limitation of rebalancing, the entity of the
problem  has  been considerably reduced  and the main  burden  arises  now from  the nationally
averaged tariffs and uneconomic customers. Oftel computed that USO costs (losses from those
subscribers  whose  avoidable costs  exceed  their  avoidable  revenue  - including  revenue  from
incoming calls) were less than £100 million in 1997 (about 0.5% of sector turnover).
14 In 1997, 2.5 million BT's users were subscribers  of a light-user scheme. Oftel estimated that I more million
people  would  like  to have a telephone  but cannot afford  it given existing  low-cost  packages.
14Oftel first decided that USO costs be funded by all operators, on the basis of indicators like
revenue shares. However, the limited entity of the burden subsequently convinced the regulator
that there is no need, for the moment, to establish a fund because USO gives BT some benefits
that outweigh the direct costs.15 In any case, the idea of a fund has not been dismissed and it may
become  relevant  in  the  future. If  that  occurs,  payments  from  the  fund  should  be  made  to
whichever firm incurs costs in providing social obligations, which basically means BT although
in  the  future other operators may  bid  for  subsidies  from  the fund  to  meet  universal  service
obligations.
4.3  Assessment of recent changes and controversial issues
The implementation of the current regime is too recent to give an ex-post assessment. What can
be said, is that the current approach is part of a broader strategy of deregulation of the industry,
completing the process of entry liberalisation and  attempting to eliminate some constraints on
BT.  The  principles  of  incentive  regulation,  successfully  experimented  with  the  price-cap
mechanism  on  final  users'  tariffs  have  finally  been  applied  to  network  services,  partially
replacing the previous cost-plus approach. Flexibility is desirable because the operator is better
placed than the regulator to set relative prices that can achieve a higher degree of efficiency. The
other side of flexibility  is the danger of anti-competitive behaviour, and this  is why Oftel has
adopted a monitoring system of floors and ceiling and it has introduced the FTC clause.
Very little is known about the properties of the dual system of partial caps that Oftel has
adopted. According to economic theory, the desirable mechanism is a global price-cap: all the
goods and  services, be  they  intermediate  or  final,  should  be  included  in  the  basket. Oftel's
approach  is  very  ad  hoc,  separating  the  partial  cap  for  residential  users  from  the  more
complicated system of network caps. The latter in particular still poses considerable constraints
on the incumbent operator.
The concept of forward-looking LRIC, used to set initial levels, also creates some tensions
with respect to investments in the long run. If the incumbent operator anticipates that it cannot
obtain extra-rents from its investment in infrastructure, it will become more reluctant to upgrade
its  network.  The same observation  applies  to  the  relatively  low  cost  of  capital that  Oftel is
applying in its calculations (12.5%) to determine BT's  charges. Moreover, the determination of
LRIC still leaves considerable discretion in its calculation.
Another controversial issue is that usage-dependent pricing is not permitted to  BT. The
same interconnection service has to be charged at the same rate, independently of the nature of
the final service supplied. This implies that demand conditions are not taken into consideration
when setting interconnection charges, and this is in contrast with insights derived from economic
theory. It is true that it is difficult to have information about demand, but one cannot conclude
15  Benefits  include  rather  cloudy  concepts  such as brand  enhancement,  ubiquity  and life-cycle  effects (an
uneconomic  customer  can become  a more  profitable  BT's customer  in the future).
15that the only option are charges purely based on costs plus an equal mark up. As an example, BT
has to offer mobile operators the same conditions it offers to other operators when they terminate
their calls on BT's  network and the access charge BT can ask is regulated. On the other hand,
when  calls  are  originated  on  BT's  network  and  terminated  on  a  mobile  network,  then  the
termination charge that the mobile operator requires is not regulated. To provide rough figures, in
the quarter July-September 1997, BT terminated a volume of 1,629 million minutes originated by
mobile users, receiving an average revenue of 1.4 p/min. In the same period, BT originated 907
million minutes of calls destined to mobile users and it had to pay an average termination charge
of  17.3 p/min. It  is true that origination and  termination involve  different costs, however  the
discrepancy is so high that Oftel asked the Monopolies and Mergers Commission to conduct a
full investigation that is still under its way. On top of the obvious question of unregulated charges
set  by  operators  with  market  power  other  than  BT  (the  mobile  operators  in  the  example
provided), the case also illustrates the following point. If demand to and from mobile users is not
very price sensitive, why should BT not cover a higher portion of its fixed costs on that segment
via higher access charges, thus allowing for price reductions in more price responsive segments?
Finally,  the  regulator  is  encouraging  private  negotiations  and  it  generally  does  not
intervene if parties are able to reach an agreement. In a context with just  a handful of relevant
operators,  it is  not  clear  that  a  successful  agreement  indicates  that  an  efficient  outcome  is
achieved. Two parties might collude on the setting of access charges in order to fix high final
prices  to  their  subscribers.  The  previous  example  on  the  mobile  termination  charges  is  an
illustration of the potential dangers arising from the unregulated setting of access charges in the
presence of market power. Oftel is promoting the idea of reciprocity,  i.e. what operator A charges
operator B for access to its own network has to be the same operator B charges A for access to the
other network. Reciprocity, however, is a good mechanism to sustain collusive deals aiming at
price fixing. The best possible example can be probably derived from international accounting
rates. The settlements agreed upon by two operators in different countries typically involve high
access charges that in the end push up retail prices. The high access prices do not seem to be
justified  on a purely cost basis, rather operators co-ordinate in order to extract higher revenues
from subscribers.
Summary: the normalisation phase
*  In the normalisation  phase (1997-2001), Oftel is  seeking a  less interventionist approach, mimicking a
competition  authority.  Regulation  of final prices focuses  only on small  users and it will end in 2001.
. Incentive  regulation  has been introduced  also for interconnection  services  (the network  price cap). The system
adopted  is still  very  ad hoc and it imposes  considerable  constraints  on BT.
*  Progressive  deregulation  brings  the risk of collusive  practices.  Oftel will have to monitor  also the behaviour  of
entrants.
165.  Conclusions
This  paper  has  described  the  evolution  of  regulation  in  the  UK  with  an  emphasis  on
interconnection charges. Oftel's  approach has been successful for consumers that have benefited
from  a reduction  of 50% of their bills  in real  terms since privatisation.  However, it is more
difficult to attribute this remarkable result either to  technological progress (BT has halved' its
workforce in the same period), to regulatory intervention (Oftel has set stringent caps until 1997)
or competition  (there are hundreds of players in the market). The outcome is due to the three
factors together,  with more  weight to  be  probably  given to  the  first two.  Entrants  have not
achieved big market shares if one thinks of the very asymmetric regulation that has been in place
for more than a decade. Indirectly at least, competition did have a positive effect for consumers
because it provided a disciplinary device on BT's behaviour.
Oftel has  opted for  a model  of competition  between  alternative networks,  rather than
competition  over  a common  infrastructure. The former can deliver  a higher  degree of direct
competition for customers but it involves some duplication of fixed costs. Oftel's  approach has
been very  interventionist until  1997, now  it is  seeking to normalise  the  industry  acting as  a
competition authority. The prospects for a complete deregulation are small, and forms of control
will remain in the industry. In particular, in the longer term Oftel should monitor not only anti-
competitive practices but  also potentially  collusive  behaviour among the bigger players (BT,
CWC, cellular operators).
The interconnection experience in the UK provides an excellent opportunity to understand
the complexity of the problem and its links with other important topics such as tariff rebalancing,
access deficit and universal service. The recent incentive regulation introduced with a network
cap based on proper accounting procedures and engineering models, despite being a bit ad hoc,
probably represents the best practice available today in the telecommunications industry.
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18Annex 1.  Summary  statistics
Sources: Oftel, Market Information Update (May 1998) and Companies' Reports
Table 1  1. Performance of BT and Mercury
1981/82  1984/85  1991/92  1992/93  1993/94  1994/95  1995/96  1996/97  1997/98
BT
Turnover (£ billion)  5.7  7.6  13.4  13 2  13 7  13.9  14.5  14.9  15.6
Employees (000s)  252  238  210  171  156  138  131  128  125
Lines (million)  26.6  27.1  27.3  27.6  27.7
Mercury (CWC)  _
Turnover (£ billion)  - - 0.9  1.2  1.5  1.7  1.8  1.7  2.3*
Employees (000s)  6  7  9  10  9  7  12*
Note: a) the fiscal year ends at 31/3. b) CWC was created with a merger on 28 April 1997. Figures * from CWC include CaTV
operators and cannot directly compare with earlier figures for Mercury.
Table 1.2. Fixed telephony services. Summary of market shares, Quarter 2 1997/98
Total UK  BT  CWC  CATV  Others
Revenues (quarter)
Local calls  £572 million  86%  6%  7%  1%
National calls  459  76  12  4  7
International calls  394  51  16  4  29
Calls to mobile  230  75  15  5  5
Other  calls  _  352  86  9  3  2
Total calls  2,007  76  10  5  9
Rental  775  91  4  4  1
Connection  62  90  3  5  2
Total revenues  2,844  80  8  5  7
Lines  (at 30/9198)  <X__
Business  8.17 million  90%  6%  2%  2%
Residential  22.87  88  4  8  0
Total  31.04  89  4  6  1
Table 1.3. Retail price control
[Period  1984-89  1989-91  1991-93  1993-97  1997-2001
Price-cap  RPI-3%  RPI-4.5%  RPI-6.25%  RPI-7.5%  RPI-4.5%
Coverage  48-53%  55-56%  64-66%  64-67%  20% (forecast)
Table 1.4. Benefits from regulation. Change of BT's prices between 1984/85 and 1996/97
Daytime 3' local call  Daytime 3' nat. call  Daytime 3' call to USA  Bus. line rental  Resid. Line rental
Change  -39%  -39% to -80%  -89%  +9%  +11%
Note: changes are in real terms, additional discounts are not included. The average decline for BT's  basic services is 48%.
19Table 1.5. Interconnection revenues and payments, Quarter 2 1997/98
Total fixed operators  BT  CWC  Mobile operators
Revenues
From  UK fixed inland:
Volume  (million  minutes)  10,977  6,161  2,078
Payment  received  (£ million)  155  84  44
Average (p/min)  1.4  1.4  2.1
From incoming  international:
Volume  (million  minutes)  1,429  948  411
Payment  received  (£ million)  190  116  69
Average  (p/min)  13.3  12.2  16.8
From  UK cellular:
Volume  (million  minutes)  1,705  1,629  76
Payment  received  (£ million)  24  23  1
Average (p/min)  1.4  1.4  1.3
Total:
Volume (million minutes)  10,480  6,718  1,620  1,201*
Payment received (£ million)  468  249  146  191*
Average (p/min)  4.5  3.7  9.0  15.9*
Costs
To UK fixed inland:
Volume (million minutes)  11,822  5,096  2,899
Payment received (£ million)  139  45  36
Average (p/min)  1.2  0.9  1.2
To outgoing international:
Volume (million minutes)  1,622  879  539
Payment (£ million)  243  137  75
Average (p/min)  15.0  15.6  13.9  1
To UK cellular:
Volume (million minutes)  1,116  907  182
Payment received (£ million)  191  157  29
Average (p/min)  17.1  17.3  15.9
Total:
Volume (million minutes)  14,989  6,882  3,623  1,705*
Payment received (£ million)  658  340  141  24*
Average (p/min)  4.4  4.9  3.9  1.4*
*  Data for cellular operators are aggregated. However in the same period 95%  of calls terminated on mobile networks were
originated on fixed networks, and more than 80% of calls originated by mobile subscribers were terminated on fixed networks.
Annex 2.  The 1985 determination
BT and Mercury agreed on interconnection terms in 1986, based  on the previous year  determination made by the DGT. The
deternination  established interconnection at the  local (3L) and trunk  (3J) levels, reflecting  a difference typical  of  analogue
networks. 3L is the normal form of subscriber access (the call is handed over at the local exchange), while 3J interconnects at the
junction side of a trunk exchange to which the BT subscriber is connected. Under 3J BT's  local loop is bypassed. Mercury has
tried to employ 3J interconnections whenever technically possible.
The main points of the determination were:
*  BT customers could choose to route long-distance calls via Mercury, or to terminate calls at Mercury destinations. Mercury
could be able to reach destinations on the BT network.  On request by Mercury, BT had to provide  interconnection at its
trunk exchanges in a certain number of cities as well as any of its local exchanges.
*  Starting  with  capital  costs,  for  trunk  interconnection,  Mercury  had  to  pay  the  sum  of  direct  costs  of  providing
interconnection and part of the incremental costs to BT for providing the requested capacity. In particular:
*  Mercury had to pay full cost of installing and maintaining physical interconnection links;
20*  Mercury  was required  to notify BT  of the interconnect  capacity  it requested  (annual  forecasts  of the number  and location  of
interconnection  points).  If actual  traffic was  higher,  Mercury  had to pay an additional  20%,
*  Mercury had to pay 50% of the incremental  capacity requirements.  This was probably due to the fact that Mercury's
customers  were  expected  to generate  increased  traffic for  BT.
*  For access  line that BT provided  for interconnection  at local exchanges,  Mercury  had to pay the normal  rental rate charged
to business  users  for  exchange  lines.
*  Turning to running costs,  for each call made  or attempted,  various charges  were set according  to the time of day and the
length  of the segment  used.
According  to Condition  13 of the BT license,  Oftel  was required  to set payments  for interconnected  calls by reference
to average costs, rather than tariffs or any other yardstick. In practice, the regulator  had to mediate  among BT's needs (the
company  was in the process of modemising its technology,  from analogue  to digital) and Mercury's requirements  to build a
network while trading profitably.  In the end, payments to BT for interconnecting  calls appeared  to allow enough margin to
finance Mercury's development.  They were set low enough compared to BT's retail prices, to allow Mercury to offer its
customers  a discount  on BT's tariff. Conveyance  charges  were determined  on a per-minute  basis  per segment  (a call can use more
segments  before  completion).  Initial  payments  are reported  in the following  table (see  Vogelsang  and Mitchell,  1997):
Table  2.1. BT's interconnection  charges  to Mercury  (p/min,  single-segment)
Segment  Cheap  Standard  Peak
Local  3L  1.0  2.3  2.6
Local  3J  1.0  2.0  2.3
Short  national  (< 56 km)  2.2  4.4  6.0
Long  national  (> 56 km)  2.4  5.0  6.5
These charges  apparently  gave strong incentives  to build a trunk network. This can be better  seen by comparing  the
access  charges  with  BT retail  tariffs. The  resulting  margins  available  to Mercury  were as follows  for a 5' call:
Table  2.2. Margins  available  to Mercury  as a percentage  of BT tariff
Cheap  Standard  Peak
Local  3L(*)  0  23  35
Local 3J(*)  0  23  42
Short  national  (*  27  45  40
Long  national  52  50  53
Short  national  (2x3J)(**)  33  50  54
Long national  (2x3J)  60  60  67
(*) Directly  connected  Mercury  subscriber  calling  a BT subscriber
(**) BT to BT, with Mercury's network  selected.  Call handed  over to Mercury at the trunk network  in the originating  area  and
handed  back by Mercury  in the destination  area.
The table indicates  that margins  were higher  for long national  calls and for short  segments  that Mercury  combined  with
its own trunk lines to deliver long-distance  calls. The weights toward calls at peak hours and trunk calls also indicate that
business  customers  were the obvious  targets for Mercury.  After the determination,  prices followed  an RPI - 3% formula.  This
may sound  like a price cap, but it was  a mere indexation  without  the flexibility  usually  left by cap mechanisms.
Annex 3.  The 1993 determination and ADC
Oftel  established  that payments  for conveyance  calls had to include:  a) conveyance  rates,  b) ADC and c) waivers.  The  calculation
of conveyance  rates  was based  on component  costs  and routing  factors.  16
In calculating  BT's component  costs,  certain overheads  were excluded  as irrelevant  to interconnection. 17 The cost of
capital in the calculation  was 15%,  derived  using  the Capital  Asset pricing Model (CAPM)  and a formula  for weighted  average
16  Routing  factors  are derived  statistically  for each type of call on the basis  of samples  that  measure  the use of the network.  The
routing  factors  represent  the average  usage  of each network  element  by each type of interconnection  segment.  They  should  give
the right incentives  to use the network  efficiently,  but distortions  can arise  from the use of historic  accounting  costs.
21cost of capital.  Averaging  over revenue  costs  and the cost of capital,  the regulator  reduced  the total  cost to Mercury  by 35% in the
period between  the 1985  and the 1993  determinations  (BT was asked  to refund Mercury  of £74 million).  In the end conveyance
rates  were set to:
Table 3.1. BT's interconnection charges to Mercury (p/min)
l__________  _  Cheap  Standard  Peak
Local  exchange  0.67  1.16  1.53
Tandem  local  0.81  1.41  1.85
Tandem  short national  0.95  1.65  2.17
Tandem  long national  1.20  2.08  2.73
These  charges  are lower  than 1985  prices, especially  for peak and long-distance  calls.  This reflects  both the downward
adjustments  in the overall  price level and the rebalancing  for different  cost levels and methodologies.  The method  had also built
in some  adjustments  to recalculate  the charges  annually  on the basis  of the most recent BT's financial  results  by service.
The access  deficit  was calculated  following  the method in the box. In percentage  terms,  the 1993  ADCs were varying
from 40% (local cheap calls) to 100% (tandem  short national  calls) of the corresponding  conveyance  rate. In monetary  terms,
some examples  are given below  (international  calls  ranged  between  2 and 58 p/min with an average  of 8.5):
Table  3.2.  ADC charged  to Mercury  (p/min)
Cheap  Standard  Peak
Local call  0.27  0.54  0.71
National  call  0.94  1.48  1.93
The Oftel rule: ADC and ECPR
The access  deficit  (AD) of the incumbent  is defined  as the revenue  obtained  from rentals minus the costs associated  with that
service  (in 1990/91,  Oftel  calculated  AD = 5% of BT's £13 billion turnover).  The rule used by Oftel  is usage-based  and allows
the deficit  to be recovered  from a mark up on each call proportional  to the profitability  of that  call for BT.
Imagine  there  are three  final markets  (see Valletti  and Estache,  1998,  section  3.1):
*  the bottleneck,  denoted  by 0 (think  of the BT's local  calls),
*  the good produced  by the incumbent,  denoted  by I (BT's long-distance  calls),
*  the good  produced  by an entrant,  denoted  by 2 (Mercury's long-distance  services).
Denote by ci the marginal  cost of production in the final market i, qi the total quantity supplied  to end users, and pi the
corresponding  price,  and a the access  charge.  The incumbent's  total  profit  iJ  can be subdivided  into  the different  profitability  of
the three activities:
X,1= Po +P  +P 2 -AD
Po  = (po  - co)qo
P  = (p  - co-cl)
P2 =(a-  co)q2
The total  contribution  of one service  to cover  AD is  proportional  to its profitability:
ADC  =P'
In unit  terms,  the access  charge  is set equal  to its direct  cost plus  the ADC  per unit:
17 The DGT excluded retail billing, bad debts, marketing and advertising and, rather controversially, the chairnan's
office. The exclusions amounted to 43% of revenue costs less plant maintenance and depreciation.
22ADCi  AD  P_
a  +qi=Co+ qi  PO+P 1+P2
As an example, if Mercury requires access  for its long-distance  services,  BT will have one call less of its own long-distance
services,  hence  a is calculated  by seting i = 1.
When  the incumbent  is regulated  so that its extra  rents are driven  to zero (;r= 0), the formula  simplifies  to:
a=co 0 +(P  -co-C l)=PI-cl
which exactly corresponds  to the efficient component  pricing rule (ECPR).  Note that there is no explicit reference  to demand
relationships,  as Ramsey-based  approaches  would  suggest.
In practice, Oftel's formula  and ECPR differ for two reasons. Oftel adopted  FDC to set co in place of direct incremental  cost.
Secondly  and abstracting  from waivers,  Mercury  was  required  to pay only 50% of the access  deficit  per minute  for both picking
and delivering  a call, in addition to the direct cost of providing  access (see Armstrong and Doyle, 1998). Mercury  received
waivers  that were applied  to local and national  traffic,  and the entrant  had only to pay ADCs in part  for international  traffic.  The
DGT's determination  was also used to determine  a first standard  price list for BT services  to other entrants.  What is important  is
that routing  factors  for  conveyance  rates are specific  to each operator  and they were incorporated  into  the methodology  adopted.
Annex  4.  Recent charges
In 1995 Oftel issued  a new determination  of standard charges  still based on fully distributed  costs (FDC).  Prices
were adjusted as actual costs were revealed using better accounting practices and engineering models. The
reconciliation  of the bottom-up  and top-down approaches  produced  hybrid  estimates  like those shown  in the fourth
column of table 4.1. There is a marked difference  with the corresponding  figures  calculated  with HCA FDC. This
partly due  to the fact  that LRIC calculations  use a cost of capital  of 12,5%,  while data for HCA  used a figure  of 15%.
If one calculates  HCA FDC  figures  using  a lower cost of capital,  then the difference  would  reduce to 4-8%.
The table below clearly  indicates  that interconnection  charges  have nearly  halved (in nominal  terms) in the
last four years.  This is due  to several  concomitant  factors:  better accounting  practices,  improved  network  efficiency,
exploitation  of economies  of scale and scope in the presence  of increased  call volumes, last but not least Oftel's
desire  to promote  competition  and fear of BT's market  power.
_Table  4.1.  Interconnection  charges  (p/min)
HCA FDC  HCA FDC  HCA  FDC  LRIC  + mark-  1996-97  1997-98
1993-94  1994-95  1995-96  up  (final)  (interim)
_____  ____  ___  _____  ___  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  ____  ____1994-95  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _  _
Local exchange  0.65  0.55  0.46  0.48  0.47  0.38
Single  tandem  1.04  0.85  0.69  0.74  0.67  0.55
Double  tandem  1.75  1.39  1.10*  1.25  1.00*  0.84*
Every charge is multiplied  by the retail  tariff  gradient  to give charges  by time of day and day of week
* Average  of three charges  by distance  band.
The interim  charges  for 1997/98  also serve as starting charges  for each safeguard  cap introduced  with the
new regime  from October 1997. The starting  charges for services contained  in the control baskets are based on a
forecast  of the relevant  LRIC plus mark-up.
Oftel has also adopted a system of floors and ceilings in order to  monitor potential anti-competitive
behaviour.  It has to be said  that a violation  of floors  and ceilings  is only a first test and  the system  does not represent
a prescriptive  rule. The key question  for Oftel is the economic  effect  that a particular  charge  can have in the relevant
market.  The floors  and ceilings  are derived  from the incremental  and stand-alone  cost methodology.  The incremental
cost is the one incurred  by BT, while ceilings  reflect  the cost of a hypothetical  efficient  operator.  The refinement  of
23the bottom-up  and top-down  approaches  has improved the allocation  of common  costs, and this is why the range
between floor and ceiling is now considerably  narrower than a few years ago. As an example, table 4.2 reports
differences  between  22% and 39% for 1995/96,  while the differences  for 1994/95  were between  40% and 82% (see
Cave, 1997b).
Table  4.2. Interconnection  service  floors  and ceilings  for 1995/96
Interconnection  service  Floor (p/min)  Ceiling  (p/min)  Difference  (%)
Local exchange  segment  0.314  0.435  39
Local-tandem  conveyance  0.159  0.193  22
Single  transit  0.068  0.083  23
Inter-tandem  conveyance*  0.188-0.494  0.230-0.626  22-27
* Includes  three categories:  medium,  short  and long.
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